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LOOK AWAY DIXIELAND: THE SOUTH AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX
Robin L. Einhorn
ABSTRACT—Although it can seem paradoxical today that the federal
government redistributes from “blue” states where majorities are tolerant of
federal taxation to “red” states where they are hostile, the rhetoric was
more straightforward in the politics surrounding the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment a century ago. In fact, Southerners and Westerners
demanded the adoption of the federal income tax for the obvious reason
that it would benefit their constituents. By exempting income taxation from
the apportionment rule that the Constitution specifies for “direct taxes,” the
Sixteenth Amendment allowed Congress to tax in proportion to the
distribution of income rather than the distribution of population. Because of
the lopsided geographical distribution of income at the time, this procedure
generated lopsided contributions from the high-income states of the
Northeast, particularly New York. Yet some Southerners also thought the
income tax was potentially dangerous because it would strengthen the
federal government, with results that could potentially threaten their
oppression of African Americans (disfranchisement, segregation, and
rampant lynching). White Southerners worried about the safety of white
supremacy in their debates with each other about whether to ratify the
Sixteenth Amendment. In the end, however, they ratified enthusiastically,
not only because they knew that their states would benefit, but also because
they believed, correctly, that Northerners had lost interest in attempting to
protect the rights of African Americans. Thus, this milestone in the history
of taxation exemplified the irony of the Progressive Era.
AUTHOR—Preston Hotchkis Professor in the History of the United States,
Department of History, University of California, Berkeley. I am grateful to
Charlotte Crane for inviting me to present this work at the symposium and
for her comments on earlier versions. Thanks also to the other symposium
participants and the Law Review team for useful feedback, to Ajay
Mehrotra and Brian Delay for helpful readings, and to Aaron Hall for
excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
We are probably all familiar with one of the most striking ironies in
American tax politics: that the places where the anti-tax and anti-spending
appeals of conservative Republicans resonate most strongly, which are
closely associated with a more general hostility to the federal government,
are the places that actually benefit most from federal taxing and spending.
Over the past few years, maps illustrating this relationship have circulated
widely on the Internet,1 the point being that they resemble the familiar
election maps that distinguish the Republican “red states” and Democratic
“blue states,”2 though with a logic that defies partisan political rhetoric—
particularly Republican partisan rhetoric.3 Generally, the more heavily
Democratic states have been subsidizing the more heavily Republican
states, even while the beneficiaries of this transfer have protested ever more
urgently against the oppressive weight of “big government.”4

1

See, e.g., Ezra Klein, The Red State Ripoff, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2010), http://voices.washington
post.com/ezra-klein/2010/04/the_red_state_ripoff.html. Most such maps rely on data from the Tax
Foundation. For an example of data relied on, see Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Spending Received by
State, 1981–2005, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 19, 2007), http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-taxes-paid-vsfederal-spending-received-state-1981-2005.
2
See Klein, supra note 1.
3
As stated in the 2012 Republican platform: “Taxes, by their very nature, reduce a citizen’s
freedom. Their proper role in a free society should be to fund services that are essential and authorized
by the Constitution, such as national security, and the care of those who cannot care for themselves. We
reject the use of taxation to redistribute income, fund unnecessary or ineffective programs, or foster the
crony capitalism that corrupts both politicians and corporations.” REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION,
WE BELIEVE IN AMERICA: 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2 (2012), http://www.gop.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf (emphasis added).
4
America’s Fiscal Union: The Red and the Black, ECONOMIST (Aug. 1, 2011, 4:16 PM),
http://www.economist.com/node/21525210, also distinguishes the states that have been net gainers from
federal taxing and spending from those that have been net losers, but it is unique in using its own data,
presenting the taxing and spending figures as percentages of GDP, and treating the 20-year period from
1990 to 2009 as a whole. The resulting pattern of net gainers and losers does not map perfectly onto the
political categories (the “red” Texas, Georgia, and Arkansas are net payers; the “blue” Maryland,
Vermont, and Oregon are net beneficiaries). Nor is it clear how The Economist defined the key
variables. Still, the general pattern in this map—states that tend to vote Democratic subsidizing states
that tend to vote Republican—resembles renderings based on the more standard Tax Foundation data.
See supra note 1.

774

108:773 (2014)

The South and the Federal Income Tax

MAP 1: FEDERAL SPENDING PER DOLLAR OF FEDERAL TAXES, 20055

Map 1 presents federal taxing and spending in the states for 2005,
using data from the Tax Foundation.6 States in the darkest shade got back
in federal spending less than 80% of what they paid in federal taxes, states
in the lightest shade got back more than 120% of what they paid, and the
other states hovered around the middle. The pattern is clear enough: the
most heavily Democratic states generally were heavy net payers; the most
heavily Republican states generally were heavy net beneficiaries. Put
another way, the Democratic “blue states” subsidized the Republican “red
states.” The map contains only two serious outliers: Maryland and Hawaii
were politically “blue” states7 that enjoyed 130% and 144% of their federal
tax burdens for obvious reasons (for example, proximity to Washington,
D.C., and military spending).8 Nevada and New Hampshire, meanwhile,
5

Map 1 is based on data from the Tax Foundation. See Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Spending
Received by State, 1981–2005, supra note 1.
6
Id.
7
2008 General Election Voter Registration Statistics, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elec
tions.gmu.edu/Registration_2008G.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2009).
8
See FED. FACILITIES ADVISORY BD. & MD. DEP’T OF BUS. & ECON. DEV., 2010: THE EFFECT OF
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT AND SPENDING IN MARYLAND, at ii (2012), available at http://www.choose
maryland.org/aboutdbed/Documents/Boards/FFAB%20Federal%20Impact%20Report.pdf;
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both register among the major net payers, but have been “swing” states in
recent elections.9 Nevertheless, although the relationship is far from
perfect, it is more than merely suggestive.10
MAP 2: NONTAXPAYERS IN 2008: PERCENTAGE OF INCOME TAX FILERS WITH
NO TAX LIABILITY11

JAMES HOSEK, AVIVA LITOVITZ & ADAM C. RESNICK, RAND CORP., HOW MUCH DOES MILITARY
SPENDING ADD TO HAWAII’S ECONOMY? at xii (2011), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR996.pdf.
9
See Chris Cillizza, The 9 Swing States of 2012, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2012, 11:51 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/the-9-swing-states-of-2012/2012/04/16/gIQABu
XaLT_blog.html.
10
I correlated the spending-to-tax burden ratio of 2005 with returns from the 2004 presidential
election, producing a correlation coefficient of 0.43 (significant at 0.01) and an R2 of 0.187. For the
2004 election returns, see Election of 2004, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/showelection.php? year=2004 (last visited June 5, 2014).
11
Map 2 is based on data and a map generated by the Tax Foundation. See Scott A. Hodge, States
Vary Widely in Number of Tax Filers with No Income Tax Liability: Southern States Have Highest
Percentages of “Nonpayers,” TAX FOUND. FISCAL FACT, May 24, 2010, at 1, http://taxfoundation.org/
sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff229.pdf. The map produced here does not contain the state rankings
reflected on the Tax Foundation map. See id.
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For another striking illustration, consider the percentage of income tax
filers with a zero or negative tax liability. Map 2 resembles a map that the
Tax Foundation posted online in 2010 using 2008 data, drawn to highlight
the states in which the highest and lowest percentages of the income tax
filers ended up with a zero or negative tax liability.12 On Map 2, the ten
states in the darkest shade had the highest percentages of filers with no tax
liability, while the ten states in the lighter gray had the lowest percentages
of zero or negative liability. The most obvious feature of this map, of
course, is the dominance of the heavily “nonpaying” category by the
Southern states. The Tax Foundation’s version of Map 2 included state
rankings that further dramatized the role of the South, locating numbers
one through nine in the continuous belt from South Carolina to New
Mexico (Idaho clocked in at number ten).13 The “nonpayer” map drew
attention during the 2012 presidential campaign after Mitt Romney’s
remark about the 47% of Americans “who believe the government has a
responsibility to care for them, . . . that they are entitled to health care, to
food, to housing, to you-name-it,” and, in addition, that they “are people
who pay no income tax.”14 Leaving aside the fact that paying no income tax
is not the same thing as paying no taxes—even most of those who pay no
income tax still pay the regressive sales, excise, and payroll taxes15—the
point of citing the “nonpayer” map during the election campaign was the
ironic expectation that Mitt Romney actually would win the states where
the largest proportions of filers were nonpayers. And, conversely, that
except in Alaska, Wyoming, and North Dakota (sparsely populated
Western states), Romney was expected to lose the states where the fewest
12

Id.
Id.
14
Lucy Madison, Fact-Checking Romney’s “47 Percent” Comment, CBS NEWS (Sept. 18, 2012,
11:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57515033-503544/fact-checking-romneys-47percent-comment/. For attention to the Tax Foundation map during the campaign, see, for example,
Samuel Goldman, Where Do the 47 Percent Live?, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 17, 2012, 9:04 PM),
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/where-do-the-47-percent-live/. Others cited data from the
Tax Policy Center. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Donald B. Marron, 5 Myths About the 47 Percent,
WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2012, at B2 (citing “[o]ur colleagues at the Tax Policy Center”); Allison Linn,
The 47 Percent: Here’s Who Pays No Federal Income Tax, NBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:13 AM),
http://economywatch.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/18/13939069-the-47-percent-heres-who-pays-nofederal-income-tax?lite (citing the Tax Policy Center’s July 2011 report). For the Tax Policy Center
data relied on, see, for example, Table T11-0173: Tax Units with Zero or Negative Tax Liability, 2004–
2011, TAX POL’Y CENTER (June 14, 2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T110173.pdf, and Rachel Johnson et al., Why Some Tax Units Pay No Income Tax, TAX POL’Y CENTER
(July 2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001547-Why-No-Income-Tax.pdf. Some
commentators cited both datasets. See, e.g., Richard Florida, The Geography of the 47%, ATLANTIC
CITIES (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/09/geography-47/33
23/; Madison, supra; Kevin Roose, Who, Exactly, Are the 47 Percent?, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 17, 2012,
6:03 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/09/who-exactly-are-the-47-percent.html.
15
Gale & Marron, supra note 14.
13
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filers were nonpayers.16 Without the double negative, President Obama
would win (and did win17) in the states where the most income tax filers
were also income tax payers. In response to the publicity, the Tax
Foundation updated its filer–payer map with 2010 data.18 Again, the South
dominated the ranks of the heavily “nonpaying” states, as Table 1 shows.
This time, Utah joined Idaho (and New Mexico) among the nonpaying
leaders, but the Southern states retained their dominance of the category.

16

See Mitt Romney Says Voters Who Support Barack Obama Are “People Who Pay No Income
Tax,” TAMPA BAY TIMES POLITIFACT, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/sep/18
/mitt-romney/mitt-romney-says-voters-who-support-barack-obama-a/ (last visited June 4, 2014) (“The
[Tax Foundation] tallied the states that had the highest percentages of non-income-tax-paying residents.
The 10 states with the highest rates of non-tax-payers are mostly ones that Romney has in the bag—
Texas, Idaho, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina. And several
states with the lowest rates are solidly in Obama’s camp, including Minnesota, Maryland and
Massachusetts.”).
17
2012 Presidential Election Results, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
special/politics/election-map-2012/president/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2012).
18
See Nick Kasprak, Monday Map: Nonpayers by State, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 24, 2012), http://tax
foundation.org/blog/monday-map-nonpayers-state.
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TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF INCOME TAX FILERS WITH ZERO OR NEGATIVE TAX
LIABILITY, 201019
Ten Highest
Rank

“Nonpayers”

Mississippi

1

44.5

Georgia

2

42.5

Alabama

3

40.3

Florida

4

39.0

Arkansas

5

38.8

South Carolina

6

38.8

New Mexico

7

38.7

Idaho

8

38.6

Texas

9

38.5

Utah

10

38.3

Ten Lowest

19

Rank

“Nonpayers”

New Jersey

41

29.2

Minnesota

42

29.2

Washington

43

29.0

Wyoming

44

28.6

Maryland

45

28.2

Connecticut

46

26.6

Massachusetts

47

26.3

New Hampshire

48

26.3

North Dakota

49

26.3

Alaska

50

22.0

Table 1 is based on data from the Tax Foundation. Id.

779

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

And that Southern role is the point of this Article. Particularly since
World War II, the federal income tax has played a key role in enabling the
federal government to redistribute the nation’s resources in a southward
direction.20 The tax has changed in many ways and performed many
functions over the century of its use, but aside from a slow start in its first
two decades,21 a significant and largely unheralded constant has been the
role of the income tax in enabling the federal budget to operate as a mighty
engine of geographical redistribution.22 Armed with the power to collect
this lucrative tax by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913,23
the federal government has raised its revenues disproportionately in the
North and distributed its spending disproportionately in the South.
Strikingly, the tax side of this history has gone all but unremarked in the
literature. The outline of the spending story is much more familiar: the
huge role that federal spending played in promoting the transformation of
the South “from cotton belt to sunbelt,”24 starting slowly in the 1930s (with,
for example, rural electrification), accelerating rapidly during World War II
(military bases, weapons contracts), and then ratcheting upward again after
1970.25 The Social Security and Medicare benefits of migrating retirees
have enhanced the pattern more recently, along with disproportionate
spending on poverty programs in the South.26

20

BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, FROM COTTON BELT TO SUNBELT: FEDERAL POLICY, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH, 1938–1980, at 132–34 (1994); GAVIN
WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH: REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY SINCE THE CIVIL WAR
259–61 (1986).
21
See DAVID L. CARLTON & PETER A. COCLANIS, THE SOUTH, THE NATION, AND THE WORLD:
PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTHERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2003).
22
For exposés of recent North-to-South redistribution, see, for example, Dave Gilson, Most Red
States Take More Money from Washington than They Put in, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 16, 2012, 4:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/11/states-federal-taxes-spending-charts-maps, which notes,
“Most politically ‘red’ states are financially in the red when it comes to how much money they receive
from Washington compared with what their residents pay in taxes.” Longer term historical studies
include: KATHERINE S. NEWMAN & ROURKE L. O’BRIEN, TAXING THE POOR: DOING DAMAGE TO THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED (2011); SCHULMAN, supra note 20; and WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 257–64.
For a view dating the crucial takeoff in Southern defense spending to the years after 1990, see
CARLTON & COCLANIS, supra note 21, at 151–62, which notes, “[S]ince 1989 the South’s share of
procurement spending has surged from 78 to 115 percent of its share of U.S. population, and from 87 to
126 percent of its share of U.S. personal income.”
23
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration.”).
24
See SCHULMAN, supra note 20.
25
See id. at 139–51.
26
See NEWMAN & O’BRIEN, supra note 22, at 140–42.
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MAP 3: FEDERAL INCOME TAX PER CAPITA, 1916 (PERSONAL AND CORPORATION)27

MAP 4: FEDERAL TAX BURDEN PER CAPITA, 200528

27

TREASURY DEP’T, OFFICE OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME,
H.R. DOC. NO. 65-1169, at 12–13 (1918) [hereinafter STATISTICS OF INCOME]; BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, ESTIMATED POPULATION FOR DRAFT APPORTIONMENT, S. DOC. NO. 65-64, at 28 (1917)
[hereinafter ESTIMATES OF POPULATION].
28
Map 4 is based upon data from the Tax Foundation. Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Spending
Received by State, 1981–2005, supra note 1.
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I.

THE PROBLEM

This Article presents preliminary results of research intended to
remedy the neglect of the tax side of this story. We can start with a rough
century-crossing comparison of 1916 and 2005. The continuities between
Map 3 and Map 4 are unmistakable. Both maps display the states with the
highest and lowest per capita federal tax burdens. In both, the highest taxes
were paid in the North and the lowest taxes were paid in the South. There
have, of course, been some significant changes over the century separating
these statistical snapshots: Oklahoma was one of the richest states in the
heyday of its oil boom in 1916,29 while the West Coast in general (and
California in particular) still had tremendous growth in its future. Nor do
the two maps present exactly comparable data: Map 3 is the sum of
individual and corporation income taxes in 1916,30 while Map 4 is all
federal taxes in 2005.31 Nevertheless, New York, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut remain among the ten states with the
highest per capita burdens across the century separating 1916 and 2005,
while South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas remain among
the ten states with the lowest per capita burdens. This continuity may be
unsurprising in itself, since much of the South has generally been
notoriously poor, but it masks a less familiar reversal in the rhetoric of
Southern politics. Today, it can seem a paradox, at best, that the federal
government redistributes from the states where majorities are tolerant of
federal taxation toward the states where they are unremittingly hostile. A
century ago, however, the rhetoric was more straightforward. Southern
politicians demanded the adoption of the federal income tax because they
knew that it would benefit their constituents.

29

Taxpayers who listed their occupations as mine owners or operators (“mines” included oil wells)
paid 88% of Oklahoma’s income tax in 1916. STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 110.
30
See supra note 27.
31
See supra note 28.
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MAP 5: PERSONAL INCOME TAX PER CAPITA, 191632

Map 5 offers another take on the 1916 data. Concentrating only on the
personal income tax (rather than combining it with the corporation tax),
this map shows the per capita burdens for all of the states. Those in the
darkest color paid an average of more than one dollar per capita; those in
the lightest paid an average of less than 25 cents.33 This is the key map for
this Article, and its features can be further emphasized by a statistic. In
1916, the first year of published income tax statistics, New York State paid
a stunning 45% of the proceeds of the personal income tax.34 Pennsylvania
came in second, paying 10%, and Illinois third at 6%.35 This result was the
point of the Sixteenth Amendment: by exempting income taxation from the
apportionment rule that the Constitution specifies for “direct taxes,” the
Amendment allowed Congress to levy its taxes in proportion to the
distribution of income rather than the distribution of population.36 More
specifically, in regard to New York, the amendment allowed Congress to
pull 45% of the income tax from a state with only 11% of the population.37
32

STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27.
See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION,
supra note 27, at 24.
34
STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 19.
35
Id. at 18–19. Massachusetts came close behind in fourth. Id.
36
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (amending id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, which required Congress to levy taxes in
proportion to the census); see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (establishing the apportionment of direct taxes).
37
See STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27, at
28. In Pollock, of course, the Supreme Court had ruled that the income tax was a “direct tax” and
33
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In per capita terms, Delaware was actually the most extreme case. New
Yorkers paid an average of seven dollars per capita in personal income
taxes in 1916, but the residents of Delaware (with a wealthy elite but a very
small overall population) paid an average over twice that figure.38 But I
really want to draw your attention to the South: the 6 cents per capita in
South Carolina, 9 cents in Alabama, 10 cents in Arkansas, 13 cents in
Mississippi, and 15 cents in Georgia.39 Outside the South, only the
relatively undeveloped Dakotas and Nevada registered comparably low
income tax burdens.40
Historians of the income tax have barely remarked on this sectional
phenomenon.41 The classic narratives of the origin of the income tax, from
the abortive 1894 tax voided in Pollock42 to the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment in 1913,43 explain the story in class terms or, when they notice
sectional dynamics, describe a combined West and South battling against
the Northeast, with “Northeast” understood essentially as a synonym for
industrial and financial capital.44 The most widely cited version, Sidney
Ratner’s American Taxation—with its cringe-worthy subtitle, Its History as
a Social Force in Democracy—was published in 1942.45 Ratner emphasizes
liberals and conservatives in an anachronistic New Deal idiom.46 Tax
therefore had to be apportioned by population. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
573–74, 582–83, modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
38
See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION,
supra note 27, at 28.
39
See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION,
supra note 27, at 28.
40
See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION,
supra note 27, at 28. I am mapping only the states, but the data also includes Washington, D.C., and the
territories of Alaska and Hawaii. The per capita figures were high in D.C. ($3.08) and Hawaii ($1.67),
and low in Alaska ($0.26). See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19;
ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27, at 28.
41
ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE,
1877–1917 (1999), is unique in emphasizing Southern support for the income tax in a major
reinterpretation of Progressivism, id. at 223–24 (“The southern periphery–insurgent alliance also
attempted to insert an income-tax amendment in the Aldrich bill.”), though Sanders mutes the point by
folding the South into a larger “agrarian” Southern and Western “periphery” defined by reliance on
“one or two cash crops produced for national and international (as opposed to local) markets.” Id. at 28.
MONICA PRASAD, THE LAND OF TOO MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND THE PARADOX OF POVERTY
125–47 (2012), emphasizes Southern support for progressive income taxation in the 1920s and 1930s.
42
See supra note 37.
43
See RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMENDMENTS BY THE STATES, S. DOC. NO. 71240, at 10–11 (1931).
44
Sanders illustrates this usage: “[T]he dynamic stimulus for Populist and Progressive Era state
expansion was the periphery agrarians’ drive to establish public control over a rampaging capitalism.”
SANDERS, supra note 41, at 3–4.
45
SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY
(1942).
46
See id. at 13–17, 307.
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conflicts, according to Ratner, pitted the “common people” against the
“plutocrats,” farmers and workers against industrialists and financiers, and,
of course, the West and South versus the Northeast.47 Ratner describes protax speeches as interesting and enlightened and anti-tax speeches, such as
those from the “pro-capitalistic New York delegation[],” as unrelentingly
hidebound and self-interested.48 Ratner’s biases are understandable and, at
this late date, should also be forgivable. Ratner was a New Dealer through
and through; in 1935, he published an article anticipating FDR’s plan to
“pack” the Supreme Court by claiming that Grant did the same thing in
1870.49 Yet Ratner occasionally had to squirm to make his case about New
Deal-style class struggle. A good example is his treatment of Joseph W.
Bailey, Texas Democrat and champion of the income tax in the Senate for
over a decade.50 After admitting that Bailey acted as a tool of Standard
Oil,51 Ratner suggested that Bailey’s advocacy of the egalitarian tax policy
might have stemmed from a “guilt complex.”52
Ratner’s gloss on Bailey is unique, but his analysis of the politics of
the income tax resembled those of his contemporaries, Roy and Gladys
Blakey53 and Randolph Paul,54 as well as the more recent journalistic
rendition by New York Times reporter Steven Weisman.55 This story—
about liberals versus conservatives, ordinary people versus plutocrats, and
the West and South versus the Northeast—has survived in part because few
historians have shown a great deal of interest in either the income tax
specifically or tax history more generally.56 Robert Stanley has offered a
47

See id. at 175–89, 219, 276; see also PRASAD, supra note 41, at 125–28.
RATNER, supra note 45, at 176–78.
49
See Sidney Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 POL. SCI. Q. 343
(1935).
50
RATNER, supra note 45, at 280–82.
51
See id. at 281. C. Vann Woodward, the renowned Southern historian, would say the same thing a
decade later. See C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877–1913, in 9 A HISTORY OF THE
SOUTH 385 (Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1951).
52
RATNER, supra note 45, at 282. Elizabeth Sanders describes Bailey as conservative on state
issues within Texas but as “a faithful representative of his state’s progressive economic inclinations” on
national issues. SANDERS, supra note 41, at 200.
53
ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1–103 (1940).
54
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954).
55
STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 133–45 (2002).
56
In particular, nobody has unpacked the geographical unit of “West and South” with reference to
the income tax. Elizabeth Sanders argues for its coherence on the basis of economic policy interests—as
the location of “peripheral agrarians”—though she notes that Westerners and Southerners disagreed
about the tariff, with Westerners supporting it and Southerners opposing it. SANDERS, supra note 41, at
3–4, 160–61. Yet even while the West and South clearly shared many economic interests in opposition
to the Northeast, they entered the twentieth century with very different relationships to the Northeast as
a result of the legacies of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction. Western politicians did not have
to worry about Northeastern interference with their racial politics, since they faced relatively little
resistance on the racial issues they cared about: wresting land from Native Americans and excluding
48
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starkly revisionist view by portraying the early income taxes as fig leaves
that elites deployed as political cover for their much larger system of
regressive taxes on consumption financing subsidies for powerful business
elites.57 Ajay Mehrotra emphasizes intellectual history, especially growing
support for the income tax among lawyers and economists at both the state
and national levels.58 Bennett Baack and Edward Ray, meanwhile, present a
statistical linkage between the states that favored the income tax and those
benefiting from military and veteran’s pension spending.59 This connection,
they argue, explains the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment that ushered
the United States into what they call “the modern age of special-interest
politics.”60
The most influential recent account of the origins of the income tax,
Elliot Brownlee’s overview in Federal Taxation in America, updates the
traditional story.61 Brownlee drops the anachronistic categories—the
liberals, conservatives, common people, and plutocrats—but posits a
regime change the earlier scholars would have recognized: from the
nineteenth-century consumption tax regime of regressive tariffs and excises
to what Brownlee dubs the “democratic statism” of the twentieth century.62
By “democratic statism,” Brownlee means taxes designed to redistribute
income in an egalitarian direction rather than merely to raise money.63 The
champions of income taxation wanted progressive rates aimed at the rich to
Asian immigrants from the United States. See generally ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE
IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943 (2003); PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE
LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1987); RICHARD WHITE, “IT’S
YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN”: A NEW HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1991).
Southern whites, in contrast, had not only experienced Reconstruction, but also knew that many
Northern Republicans continued to harbor hopes of defending the rights of Southern blacks until the
early twentieth century. See generally CHARLES W. CALHOUN, CONCEIVING A NEW REPUBLIC: THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE SOUTHERN QUESTION, 1869–1900 (2006); STANLEY P. HIRSHSON,
FAREWELL TO THE BLOODY SHIRT: NORTHERN REPUBLICANS & THE SOUTHERN NEGRO, 1877–1893
(1962).
57
See ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1913, at 16–17 (1993).
58
See, e.g., AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 409–11 (2013); Ajay K. Mehrotra,
Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual
Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793, 1863–66 (2005); Ajay K. Mehrotra, The
Intellectual Foundations of the Modern American Fiscal State, 138 DÆDALUS 53, 53–54, 60 (2009).
59
Bennett D. Baack & Edward John Ray, Special Interests and the Adoption of the Income Tax in
the United States, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 607, 619–20, 624 (1985). Baack and Ray present only statistical
evidence, without any evidence of articulated intentions.
60
Id. at 624.
61
W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY (2d ed. 2004).
62
Id. at 44–45.
63
Democratic statists “designed their tax program to restructure the market-driven machinery for
distributing income and wealth.” Id. at 45.
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redress what they saw as the severe maldistribution of income and wealth
in the age of robber barons and monopolistic trusts. “Those who believed
they had faced expropriation,” Brownlee explains, “would now do the
expropriating.”64
Like the earlier historians, Brownlee acknowledges that the idea of
using federal taxation for purposes other than revenue raising was not an
innovation of “democratic statism,” much less of the income tax.65 The
tariffs of the consumption tax regime had always been framed chiefly to
implement a public policy: protectionism to stimulate (or at least subsidize)
American industries. Tariff politics had always been mainly about the
redistributive effects of protectionism, though it also involved logrolling
and party-building strategies. From the days of Jefferson and Hamilton
through the Nullification Crisis of the 1830s, the Walker and Morrill tariffs,
the post-Civil War establishment of massive protectionism as Republican
doctrine, and then the truly dreary series of tariffs that echoed the election
returns—the Mongrel, McKinley, Wilson–Gorman, Dingley, Payne–
Aldrich, Underwood, Fordney–McCumber, and Smoot–Hawley tariffs—
the design of the tariff schedules never hinged more than incidentally on
the customs receipts.66 Politicians made assorted claims about whether
revenues would rise or fall, but they cared only to the extent that fiscal
results could affect the power of protectionist coalitions.67 In any case, as
the tariff expert Frank Taussig explained at the end of the nineteenth
century, such revenue projections rested “simply on guesswork.”68
64

Id.
Id. at 40–43.
66
See EDWARD STANWOOD, AMERICAN TARIFF CONTROVERSIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
(1903); F.W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. New York, G.P. Putnam’s
Sons 1899). Most tariff scholars stress the dominance of protection over revenue concerns in tariff
debates. See, e.g., PHILLIP W. MAGNESS, FROM TARIFFS TO THE INCOME TAX: TRADE PROTECTION AND
REVENUE IN THE UNITED STATES TAX SYSTEM 354–55 (2009); JOANNE REITANO, THE TARIFF
QUESTION IN THE GILDED AGE 135–37 (1994); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE
TARIFF 26–27 (1935); TAUSSIG, supra, at 354–58; TOM E. TERRILL, THE TARIFF, POLITICS, AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1874–1901, at 9–11, 13 (1973); Douglas A. Irwin, Higher Tariffs, Lower
Revenues? Analyzing the Fiscal Aspects of “The Great Tariff Debate of 1888,” 58 J. ECON. HIST. 59,
71 (1998). For the opposing view, emphasizing the centrality of the revenue, see John Mark Hansen,
Taxation and the Political Economy of the Tariff, 44 INT’L ORG. 527, 528, 539 (1990).
67
See, e.g., RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900 (2000). For an illustration of the incidental nature of the tariff’s
revenue impact, note that the federal government ran budget surpluses in every year from 1866 to 1893,
and often very large surpluses; in 1883 the surplus was half the size of total federal spending. John
Joseph Wallis, Table Ea584-587: Federal Government Finances—Revenue, Expenditure, and Debt:
1789–1939, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 5-80 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds.,
Millennial ed. 2006). Starting in 1869, the tariff produced between around half and two-thirds of federal
tax revenue in this period. Id.; John Joseph Wallis, Table Ea588-593: Federal Government Revenue, by
Source: 1978–1939, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 5-82.
68
TAUSSIG, supra note 66, at 355–56.
65
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With the exception of Louisiana sugar interests,69 Southerners had
generally been staunch opponents of a protectionism they saw as Northern
robbery: increasing the prices of the things they bought and potentially
impairing the prices of the things they sold on international markets.
Indeed, the tariff was itself widely understood as a mighty engine of
geographical redistribution, whose results were all the more sinister
because they were hard to measure.70 By the late nineteenth century, the
“taxes” that the tariff imposed on consumers to subsidize protected
industries (by letting them charge higher prices) were much higher than the
revenue the federal government raised from customs receipts.71 These
subsidies were widely understood not only to be massive (even though they
never appeared in Treasury accounts as either “taxing” or “spending”), but
also to be enjoyed mainly by the largest and richest industrial
corporations.72 Westerners had often agreed with Southerners in criticizing
this system,73 but, as the political scientist Richard Bensel explains, the
Republican party managed to forge durable protectionist coalitions across
the North in the late nineteenth century not only through the traditional
method (adding protection for Western products to buy Western support for
the system as a whole), but also by spending the revenue on what
developed into a gigantic program of Civil War pensions for Union Army
veterans.74 Needless to say, veterans of the defunct Southern Confederacy
69

See RICHARD FOLLETT, THE SUGAR MASTERS: PLANTERS AND SLAVES IN LOUISIANA’S CANE
WORLD, 1820–1860, at 27–45 (2005) (on pre-Civil War tariff); JOSEPH SITTERSON, SUGAR COUNTRY:
THE CANE SUGAR INDUSTRY IN THE SOUTH, 1753–1950, at 324–42 (1953) (on post-Civil War tariff).
70
For the antebellum tradition, see WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816–1836, at 107 (1968), and BRIAN SCHOEN,
THE FRAGILE FABRIC OF UNION: COTTON, FEDERAL POLITICS, AND THE GLOBAL ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL
WAR 101–02, 131–32 (2009).
71
Because these “taxes” could not be measured, estimates of their size varied. In 1888, for
example, a member of the House Ways and Means Committee suggested that they imposed taxes four
times higher than the customs receipts. CUSTOMS TARIFFS: SENATE AND HOUSE REPORTS 1888, 1890,
1894, 1897, S. DOC. NO. 60-547, at 158 (1909). In 1909, the New York Times pegged them at 6.5 times
the customs receipts. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 53, at 32; Mr. Aldrich’s “Surprise,” N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1909, at 6. In fact, however, these estimates were probably too low since they were derived
from the customs receipts, that is, from the taxes on goods actually imported. Prohibitively high duties,
which blocked imports of the protected goods, allowed domestic firms to raise their prices without
raising any revenue for the Treasury. Ways and Means chairman William L. Wilson explained this
problem in 1893: “As so many of the rates of the present law are really prohibitory, it is impossible to
say what its real rate of taxation is, but it is safe to affirm that it is much higher than any import tables
will disclose.” S. DOC. NO. 60-547, at 291.
72
Hence Democrats routinely describing the tariff as “the mother of trusts,” see, e.g., DEMOCRATIC
CONG. COMM., DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN BOOK: CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1906, at 38 (1906), or, in a
slightly more colorful version from 1888, “the nursing mother of trusts.” S. DOC. NO. 60-547, supra
note 71, at 127.
73
See BENSEL, supra note 67, at 8, 464; SANDERS, supra note 41, at 160–61.
74
See BENSEL, supra note 67, at 462–63. For the vast scope of the veterans pensions, see WILLIAM
H. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 123–270, 275 (David Kinley ed.,
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did not share in this bounty. Thus, the combination of tariffs and pensions
into what Bensel calls the “tariff policy complex”75 only increased Southern
hostility to Republican protectionism.76 The tariff burdened Southerners to
hand ever larger sums of money to Northerners.77
It is not that historians have failed to notice Southern support for the
federal income tax, in both its Populist and Progressive incarnations, but
that they have tended to downplay it.78 There are several good reasons for
this. First of all, it is hard to tell a story about rising “democracy” in this
period that casts the South in a leading role. The major developments in
Southern political history from the 1890s through the 1910s included the
disfranchisement campaign that denied voting rights to all blacks and many
poor whites.79 These decades witnessed the establishment of segregation as
state law,80 famously endorsed by the Supreme Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson,81 and the heyday of lynching as public terrorism, mainly though
not only in the South: 3943 lynchings in the South from 1880 to 1930,
claiming 3220 African-American victims (82% of the total).82 Second,
Southern poverty—the fact that very few Southerners could expect to pay
income taxes83—may have rendered their economic interests too
predictable to be noteworthy. The low Southern per capita averages in Map
5 can be supplemented by striking statistics. As a region, the South’s 25.9%
of the population filed 12.7% of the personal income tax returns in 1916,
reported 10% of the income, and paid 7.6% of the tax.84 The reality was
actually even more extreme, since Delaware and Maryland alone accounted
for 28% of the region’s income and 46% of its personal income tax

1918), describing “the great liberality of the provisions made by general pension legislation for the
soldiers of the Civil War and their dependent relatives,” and THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 102–03, 107–09
(1992).
75
BENSEL, supra note 67, at xiii–xix, 494–506.
76
See id. at 487–88.
77
See supra note 66.
78
See, e.g., BROWNLEE, supra note 61; RATNER, supra note 45.
79
J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 6–8 (1974); MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE
FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888–1908, at 1, 10–12 (2001).
80
WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 211–12, 350–52.
81
165 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896).
82
W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, Introduction to UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE
SOUTH 4 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997). More generally and from a large literature, see, for
example, DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK
AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2012).
83
See supra Map 5 (providing the personal income tax per capita in 1916).
84
STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27, at
28.
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payments.85 For historians of the income tax, moreover, the traditional
Southern hostility to the tariff would have made Southern support for the
income tax even more predictable, particularly to the extent that it was
expected to do what it ultimately did do: replace the tariff as the principal
source of federal revenue.86 Yet there is also an irony here. Southern
critiques of the tariff had often sounded like arguments against federal
taxation more generally. For decades, Southerners had been claiming that
the tariff, which was the only federal tax from 1817 until the outbreak of
the Civil War,87 constituted a dangerous increase in federal power.88 The
argument that a far more intrusive federal income tax could solve that
problem is at least noteworthy.
Historians have also had good reasons to emphasize developments in
other regions. The big political story of the congressional session that sent
the amendment to the states in 1909 had nothing to do with the South. It
was a struggle between Regular and Insurgent Republicans, with the
Insurgents hailing mainly from the Northwest.89 This struggle split the
Republican party, led to major Democratic gains across the North in 1910
and 1912, and, in the four-way presidential race of 1912, ushered Woodrow
Wilson into the White House as the second Democrat and first Southerner
since the Civil War.90 As John Buenker has shown in a detailed study, the
Sixteenth Amendment could not have won ratification without support in
the Northeast—and it could not have won that support without Democratic
landslides in 1910 and 1912.91 We can use the House of Representatives as
a quick measure of these landslides. In the 61st Congress (elected in 1908),
Democrats held only 20% of the seats from the Northeast; in the 62nd
(1910), they held more than 40%, and in the 63rd (1912) they held almost

85

28.

86

STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27, at

See John Joseph Wallis, Table EA594-608 Federal Government Internal Tax Revenue, by
Source: 1863–1940, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 67, at 5-85; John
Joseph Wallis, Table Ea588-593 Federal Government Revenue, by Source: 1789–1939, in HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 67, at 5-82.
87
ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 111 (2006).
88
The Nullification Crisis was only the most obvious occasion for Southern anti-tariff hostility. See
RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS, AND THE
NULLIFICATION CRISIS 7–9 (1987); FREEHLING, supra note 70, at 25 (“There was nothing more
commonplace in pre-Civil War America than a southern crusade against high protective tariffs.”).
Overtly protectionist policymaking is usually dated to the 1816 tariff, but Southerners opposed even its
earliest incarnation in 1789. See TAUSSIG, supra note 66, at 68.
89
See DAVID P. THELEN, ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE AND THE INSURGENT SPIRIT 52–98 (1976);
David Sarasohn, The Insurgent Republicans: Insurgent Image and Republican Reality, 3 SOC. SCI.
HIST. 245 (1979).
90
THELEN, supra note 89.
91
See JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 239–49 (1985).
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60%.92 Democrats also made big gains in the Midwest (30% to 50% to
60%) and West (20% to nearly 30% to over 40%). In the South, the
Democrats had little growing room (from 85% in 1908 to a bit over 90% in
1910, then a bit under 90% in 1912), though the seniority the Southern
members had accrued by the time their new Northern colleagues arrived
meant big boosts to their power.93
The Northern electoral drama was part of the larger phenomenon
known as Progressivism. Historians have debated for generations about
how to describe the Progressive movement. These debates have hinged on
class, ethnicity, gender, urbanization, professionalization, religion, and
more, but they rarely so much as mention the federal income tax.94 This
Article is not the place to offer yet another new interpretation of
Progressivism in the North, but the income tax can help us make sense of
the Southern role in the national story. Southern historians usually describe
a pale reflection of the North’s Progressive movement. C. Vann Woodward
famously called his chapter on the subject Progressivism—for Whites
Only,95 which J. Morgan Kousser, studying education in North Carolina,
qualified further to Progressivism—for Middle-Class Whites Only.96 Dewey
Grantham’s modest title, Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation of
Progress and Tradition, makes the same point.97
Yet if we treat the income tax the way that most tax historians have, as
a major milestone of egalitarian Progressivism,98 then the South must
belong in the vanguard of the movement. Southerners also supported other
policies intended to strengthen farmers against Northern big business:
antitrust, rural credit, agricultural warehousing, highway subsidies, and, of
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Calculated from KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1789–1989, at 162–67 (1989).
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Id. On seniority and the power of Southern Democrats in Congress, see, for example, V.O. KEY,
JR., WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ALEXANDER HEARD, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 667
(1949); MICHAEL PERMAN, THE SOUTHERN POLITICAL TRADITION 71–73 (2012); DAVID M. POTTER,
THE SOUTH AND THE CONCURRENT MAJORITY 22–23, 31, 37–40 (Don E. Fehrenbacher & Carl N.
Degler eds., 1972).
94
For the canonical review of the literature until about 1980, see Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of
Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 113 (1982). For highlights of more recent work from various
perspectives, see ROBYN MUNCY, CREATING A FEMALE DOMINION IN AMERICAN REFORM, 1890–1935
(1991); ERIC RAUCHWAY, BLESSED AMONG NATIONS: HOW THE WORLD MADE AMERICA (2006);
DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998);
SANDERS, supra note 41; and SKOCPOL, supra note 76.
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WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 369.
96
J. Morgan Kousser, Progressivism—for Middle-Class Whites Only: North Carolina Education,
1880–1910, 46 J. S. HIST. 169 (1980).
97
DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, SOUTHERN PROGRESSIVISM: THE RECONCILIATION OF PROGRESS AND
TRADITION (1983).
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See, e.g., RATNER, supra note 45.
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course, lower tariffs,99 though there were limits. George Tindall illustrates
these limits by quoting a frustrated Southern child labor advocate: “We
believe in investigating the New York insurance companies and even the
railroads,” but Southerners are never willing “to appoint an inspector to
look into conditions in our mill villages” because they believe that “most of
the bad rich live next to Wall Street, and certainly north of the Mason and
Dixon line.”100 The erasure of class-based oppression within the South,
however, is obviously not the main problem with identifying white
Southern politicians as egalitarian trailblazers. The real problem is that the
period we still often call the Progressive Era was the heyday of
disfranchisement, segregation, and lynching.101 This fact offers crucial
context to the Southern ratification debates.
II. THE SOLUTION
Only Southerners treated the Sixteenth Amendment mainly as a states’
rights problem. Buenker attributes Virginia’s failure to ratify to the
subservience of its ruling political machine to Northern business interests,
but the 1910 debate in the state House of Delegates actually focused
elsewhere.102 Opponents in Virginia said the same thing over and over: that
the income tax would dangerously strengthen the federal government. One
legislator urged Virginia not to “surrender to imperialism,” to a tax that
“would bring the Federal government for the first time into the lives of
ordinary citizens in the everyday affairs of life.”103 A self-described
“humble survivor of the ‘Lost Cause’” appealed to the “sons of the men
who followed Lee” to “[s]tand by what your fathers fought for.”104 Another
delegate recalled Reconstruction, when “the North had sent satraps to the
South to enter every home and go to every crossroads after the Civil
War.”105 Then, there was the worst threat of all: “Perhaps at some time a
South-hating man might be President, and negroes might fill these
positions,” creating the danger of “a negro entering his home and assessing
99

SANDERS, supra note 41.
10 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1913–1945, at 6–7
(Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1967).
101
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
102
See BUENKER, supra note 91, at 198–200, 230–34; Buenker also suggests that the Richmond
Times-Dispatch, “the machine’s leading organ,” disapproved due to its “strong states rights objections,”
id. at 231–32; but it actually endorsed the amendment in an editorial on January 19, 1910, urging
against states rights fears: “[T]here is no need at present to conjure up terrifying perversions of a power
which is in itself a proper attribute of the central government.” The Income Tax, TIMES-DISPATCH
(Richmond), Jan. 19, 1910, at 6.
103
Virginia Rejects Income Tax Bill, TIMES-DISPATCH (Richmond), Mar. 8, 1910, at 1 (describing
Virginia House Speaker Richard E. Byrd’s statement in the House).
104
Id. (statement of Mr. Stubbs).
105
Id. (describing the statement of Mr. Taliaferro).
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the incomes from the sale of eggs and butter.”106 The supporters of
ratification took these objections very seriously. One “hoped that the
prejudices of war times had passed away”107 and another advised Virginians
not to be “frightened by the bugaboo of the reconstruction period.”108 Most
of the supporters emphasized their obligations as Democrats to follow their
party’s endorsement and the fact that Virginia would benefit from a tax that
“discriminates only in favor of the poor.”109 The real issue, as another
explained in frustration, was “whether we continue the burden of the tariff
or put it elsewhere.”110 “The war is over, and for God’s sake let us not bring
these things into the practical problems of the day. We must look to the
future, and not to the past.”111
For another example, consider Georgia. Supporters of the Amendment
argued that the income tax would permit Congress to reduce or even
abolish “the iniquitous high tariff”112 and that “most of the revenue to be
derived from the income tax will come from north of the Mason and Dixon
line.”113 One legislator cited Hetty Green, “the richest woman in the world,”
who currently, without the income tax, “paid no more Federal tax than a
factory girl,”114 while another predicted, correctly, “that under an income
tax New York state alone would pay more into the United States treasury
than all the southern states put together.”115 As in Virginia, Georgia’s
supporters stressed the Democratic Party’s stand in favor of the
Amendment, but the Georgia opponents countered by claiming that it was
really “a Republican trick and clap trap.”116 It was “a Trojan horse,” looking
like a gift of tariff reduction but actually full of Republican schemes to
“destroy the last vestige of state’s rights” and increase federal revenues to
finance “extravagant” spending on such items as road building in the
Philippines.117 But, of course, extravagance was not the only issue. One
opponent reminded his colleagues, somewhat enigmatically, that
106
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108
Id. (describing the statement of Mr. Page).
109
Id. (describing the statement of Mr. McRae).
110
Id. (describing the statement of Judge Williams).
111
Id. (statement of Judge Martin Williams).
112
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statement of Mr. Lovejoy); see Lawyers Offered Thousands to Aid Income Tax Bill?, ATLANTA J.,
July 11, 1910, at 1.
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(recalling the statement of Mr. Jackson).
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Senate Carries over Income Tax Amendment, ATLANTA J., July 18, 1910, at 15.
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“distrusting the Republican party” was a widely shared view in Georgia:
“The south has received no consideration at their hands, nor will we, until
they are washed and purified.”118 Others spelled out the nonfiscal issue.
One combined a complaint that the income tax would hand the federal
government “uncontrolled power over private citizens” with his doubt that
Republican administrations “would appoint all white collectors in the
South.”119 Another opponent made the same racial argument by warning
“that this state will be filled with Federal tax collectors, white and black,
asking us all as to our income, looking into our books, querying as to how
much cotton we made last year, what our income was.”120 Still others
alluded to race indirectly in the language of federalism, such as the
legislator who surprised himself by voting yes, “saying he had given some
years of his life to the fight of the ‘60s for state’s rights and that he never
thought he would vote for anything like this giving more power to the
central government” until he had determined to his satisfaction that
Georgia’s rights were protected.121 The supporters pled with their
colleagues to recognize “that the Civil War was in the past and that the old
feeling should be forgotten,”122 that the opponents were cynically
“inventing the bugaboo of a negro collector,”123 and, strangely, that a
federal tax on the rich reflected “the principles of southern democracy as
laid down by Thomas Jefferson.”124
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MAP 6: SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT: RATIFICATION BY YEAR125

Most Southern legislatures aired these concerns, which a Georgia
newspaper described as “[s]tate sovereignty, centralization of government
in Federal hands, and the negro.”126 Nevertheless, only Virginia and Florida
in the South failed to ratify. Not only did the other Southern states all
endorse the Amendment, but they led the ratification movement, as Map 6
shows.127 Seven of the first nine states to ratify had been slave states during
the Civil War. Alabama was first, followed by Kentucky, South Carolina,
Mississippi, Maryland, Georgia, and Texas. Only Illinois and Oklahoma
interrupted the string of early Southern ratifications, with Ohio then
claiming the tenth position.128 Buenker glosses the outcome in the Southern
states: “In this case, at least, the instinct of the average white Southerner for
his own self-interest proved strong enough to overcome those who sought
to appeal to his fears.”129 Put another way, although Southern opponents of
125

The map is based on information from a 1931 Senate document on the ratification of the
constitutional amendments by state, prepared by the Library of Congress’s Legislative Reference
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BUENKER, supra note 91, at 238. Southern politicians had waged similar debates with each
other in the 1880s over the Blair Education Bill, which Congress considered repeatedly but never
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the income tax evoked their memories of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
the supporters believed that times had changed.
And they were right. The North in general and Republican Party in
particular had indeed abandoned their earlier efforts to use federal power to
protect the rights of African Americans in the South. Many Republicans
had continued to hope that they could use federal power to protect Southern
blacks in the 1880s, but the defeat of the Federal Elections Bill or Lodge
Bill (which Southerners called the Force Bill) in 1890 was a decisive defeat
for such hopes of interventionist policy.130 Indeed, between this 1890 defeat
and the 1921 introduction of the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill, which did not
pass either,131 the South never faced even a remotely serious threat that
Northerners would try to mobilize the power of the federal government to
help Southern blacks.132 We have a name for the period from 1890 to 1921:
the Progressive Era. Historians have noticed the significance of “sectional
reconciliation” themes in American culture in this era.133 The Sixteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1913, which was also the fiftieth anniversary of
the Battle of Gettysburg, celebrated at the battlefield by a reunion of over
50,000 surviving Union and Confederate veterans, together at last as
Americans.134 Two years later, D.W. Griffiths’ film Birth of a Nation
dramatized the nation-building appeal of antiblack terror, endorsed by the
historian in the White House (Woodrow Wilson).135
The conclusion is inescapable: Southern politicians supported the
Sixteenth Amendment because they believed that the South would benefit,
as tax historians have long recognized, but they also, critically, felt secure
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Northern curricular supervision—schools forced to teach that “old John Brown was a saint or that Lee
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130
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in supporting it because of a new confidence that increasing the power of
the federal government would not tempt Northerners to interfere with their
oppression of African Americans. They did not know quite how much they
would gain as the federal budget grew over the ensuing decades. Nor did
they know quite how long Northerners would continue to ignore the
African-American freedom struggle. They could not have known that the
New Deal and World War II would pour national (that is, Northern)
resources into the South while allowing Southern whites to deny the
benefits to Southern blacks (for example, in Social Security and the G.I.
Bill).136 Nor could they know that they would enjoy decades of minimal
Northern pressure on segregation or disfranchisement. But they did know
one thing: that they were living in the Progressive Era. Hayne had not
wanted Webster’s railroad in 1830 because it would allow Massachusetts to
interfere with slavery in South Carolina.137 The Progressive Era was
different, promising subsidy without interference. Of course Southerners
seized this new opportunity.
CONCLUSION
The Sixteenth Amendment made it possible for Congress to greatly
expand the power of the federal government, starting with the financing of
World War I. Despite its obvious appeal to Southerners on economic
grounds, their support for the income tax still represents a historical
problem in the period when white Southerners insisted on the sovereignty
of the states over the security of white supremacy. The Sixteenth
Amendment forced Southern politicians to grapple with the traditional
appeal of “states’ rights” in debates with each other. This Article suggests
the need to bring our understanding of the origin of the federal income tax
up to date by taking the racial politics of this period seriously. Arguments
about “states’ rights” have meant many things in American history but,
particularly in the South, they have often meant autonomous power to
oppress African Americans. Because the economic interests of the
Southern states were so clear, there may well have been little irony in
Southern support for the Sixteenth Amendment during the Progressive Era.
This fact, however, does nothing to diminish the retrospective irony in the
enthusiastic Southern embrace of the federal income tax.
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